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that his own government has assumed with reference to these matters. He points out that our alleged rights of participation in the inshore fisheries of Canada are wholly incompatible with our contentions for exclusive privileges in Bering Sea.

There are a few minor inaccuracies in the volume which may be typographical, but one is surprised to see it stated, on page 312, that the Greek insurrection of 1821 was crushed by the allied powers of Europe, and on page 314 that Canning succeeded Castlereagh as Prime Minister. It is difficult to know just what place to assign this volume in the literature of the subject. For the general reader it is too detailed, from the list of reference books it is debarred by the lack of an index, while the entire absence of footnotes or references of any kind to authorities will render it of little value to the student.

JOHN HOLLADAY LATANÉ.

*Civil History of the Government of the Confederate States with some Personal Reminiscences.* By J. L. M. CURRY, LL.D. (Richmond, Virginia : B. F. Johnson Publishing Company. 1901. Pp. 318.)

LIKE Dr. Curry's earlier sketch, called *The Southern States of the American Union considered in their Relation to the Constitution of the United States and to the resulting Union*, this counterpart of it is written in a lucid, candid, and persuasive style. Although the author was an Alabama Representative in Washington for four years before secession, and then divided the next four years between the Confederate Congress and the army, he feels neither bitterness nor personal regret. In most respects this volume is much like a record of a series of monologues by a well-read and thoughtful public man. Scholarly or thorough it does not pretend to be : in reality, it is a popular work in defense of secession, with a description of the excellencies of the Confederate Constitution and an outline of the political history of the Confederacy.

About one-third of the volume, called the "Legal Justification of the South in Secession," is essentially the substance of the familiar Calhoun argument with mollifying variations. Everywhere the question is assumed to have been one of principle and constitutional law ; nowhere does it appear that slavery was the cause of the strife or even a chief factor in the problem of getting a new government whose corner-stone should be slavery. On December 10, 1859, Dr. Curry made, in the House of Representatives, perhaps the most careful political speech of his life. In it he contemplated and advocated secession in case either Chase or Seward should be elected the following year, and yet he did not express a single word of complaint on any subject not directly concerned with the Southern interest in slavery. Remove the issue of slavery, and the South would have thought no more about secession than the Northwest did. Why this great difference in attitude then and now, common to perhaps ninety-nine per cent. of the surviving Confederate lead-

ers? They then as confidently believed in the right and the economic necessity of slavery as they did in the institution of marriage. Now there is not an intelligent man among them that does not feel that it was wrong. Therefore, although one grant their claim to a constitutional right to secede, they cannot fully vindicate themselves, even to themselves, without forgetting the chief motive of their action—a determination to protect slavery not only from unconstitutional interference, but to put it out of reach of the assaults of abolitionists and to withdraw from association with a section whose hatred of slavery and slave-holders was sure to undermine and destroy the prestige of Southern politicians. In time it will dawn upon the South that the quality of the purpose of a great political movement is often quite as important as any question of an abstract principle of legality. Suppose we should discover to-morrow that the Pilgrims or the Huguenots were persecuted not because they wished to worship according to their consciences, but to blaspheme according to wanton whims; that the Revolution did not grow out of a tax on tea, but of an attempt of George III., by all legal and some illegal measures, to cause the wealthy colonists to give up the custom of importing and keeping, say, Chinese concubines, what wonderful arguments would soon be evolved by the dogmatists and the theological historians, and how the noble collectors of genealogical scraps would rewrite family “histories”! Dr. Curry produces a good *legal* defense, yet it will not suffice for a justification, which is really what he seeks.

The 172 pages, divided into eight chapters, called the “civil” history of the Confederacy, are a meager but mild and generally pleasing account of many of the leading features of the political history of the four exhausting years of the government’s life. There are, here and there, some really valuable bits of reminiscence and description, but aside from a good chapter on the Confederate Constitution there is little more than the traditional account of men and events. The author rests as implicitly now as forty years ago in the belief that Floyd was a much abused and perfectly upright man, and that the Confederate commissioners to Washington in the spring of 1861 came like angels of mercy but were treated with less honor than prevails among thieves. If Dr. Curry had read either all the records or the statements of reliable historians he would hold very different opinions on these subjects. Likewise, if he had turned to Livermore’s *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War*, he would hardly have ventured to assert (p. 153): “A maximum estimate of the troops in the Confederate army, from beginning to end, would be 700,000.” There were nearly a million. The excellent chapter on the Confederate Constitution is supplemented with an appendix where the Federal and Confederate Constitutions are placed in parallel columns and the important Confederate features are clearly brought out by the use of italics.

The volume has incidental value to the historian. Its mild temper and perfect honesty of purpose, though sometimes misdirected by war-time allusions, ought to make the book attractive to the ordinary reader,

who seeks general information and is not very particular about minor points. Psychologically it has rare importance ; it is an almost perfect record of how even the best and most intelligent Confederates came in time, and by unconscious and even amiable self-deception to believe that secession was the necessary result of their sacred reverence for the strict letter of the Constitution.

FREDERIC BANCROFT.

*The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy.* By JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph.D. (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press. 1901. Pp. 291.)

THE material for writing a history of the diplomatic relations of the Southern Confederacy is quite abundant, but it is scattered through a great variety of publications. Much of it is to be found in the biographies of the public men who conducted the affairs of the inchoate government, in the narratives of naval and financial agents sent abroad by that government, in the published Rebellion archives, in magazine articles, and, lastly, in the unpublished archives of the Confederate State department now in possession of the Federal government.

It has been the task of Professor Callahan to gather into a consecutive narrative, for the first time, this diverse and scattered material and give to the public a sketch of the diplomatic history of the Confederacy. A small book of less than three hundred pages on such a subject must necessarily be only a sketch, as its compass precludes the production of documents or any detailed account of events. The author was well fitted for the task, as he is devoting his life to this class of work, and has already given to the public a number of volumes on kindred topics. The reader will find that the task has been well and impartially done, and that he is furnished with a very interesting account of this most important branch of the Confederacy's efforts and failures.

If the work is examined with the critic's eye there will be found a few, not many, defects. The narrative of events is sometimes repeated in different chapters, and occasionally in almost identical language. This is allowable, in fact proper, in presenting the subject by way of lectures to students at intervals of time, but should have been corrected in book form. There are abundant citations of authorities which are helpful to students and useful to the general reader, but they are not always complete. A citation of "Nicolay and Hay's *Lincoln*," which is given more than once, without designating volume or page, is very inadequate in referring to a work of ten volumes.

Professor Callahan shows that the great object of all Confederate diplomatic effort, and in reality the chief hope of the success of the Confederacy, was to secure European intervention, especially that of Great Britain and France. It was apparent to the thoughtful men of the South that it was an ill-matched contest of arms ; that with the overwhelming preponderance of the North in men and material resources the